The standard tool of project evaluation, the Net Present Value criterion, seems applicable to natural resource projects, such as a hydroelectric dam or clear-cutting land for agriculture. But as Arrow and Fisher (1974) argues, resource project evaluation has to account for restoration diculties in case of project failures. This feature has generated a rich literature on investment decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility, or Real Option Theory (ROT). 1 The major argument of ROT is that facing irreversibility and uncertainty, i t m a y p a y to delay the investment and wait for information to avoid the downside risk. Thus, conventional project evaluation leads to too early or too much i n v estment.
The assumption of absolute irreversibility i n R OT is in most cases too strong, given resource restoration eorts currently going on around the world. 2 Fish population reduced by a dam may berestored by decreasing the capacity of or even destroying the dam. 3 Clear cutting forest may endanger valuable species, and restoration involves reforestation to preserve these species.
Most of the ROT literature 4 focus on the timing of investment and do not allow v ariable project size. We call this 0-1 approach since the decision for the current period is either full (the \1") or no development (the \0"). The major conclusion of the 0-1 model is that increased uncertainty tends to delay the investment. Pindyck (1988) considers variable project size but does not allow costly restoration. He concludes that increased uncertainty reduces the level of investment. This paper aims to extend ROT to allow for restoration of natural resource projects that may result in negative environmental benets. Irreversibility is not assumed, instead economic optimization determines the extent of restoration and whether zero restoration (irreversibility) is 1 see Arrow and Fisher (1974) , Henry (1974) , Dixit and Pindyck (1994) , Epstein (1980) , Freixas and Laont (1984) , Ulph and Ulph (1997) , and Kolstad (1996) . 2 There are eorts to restore the Everglades in Florida, the San Francisco Bay Delta in California, the Rhon River in France, the Pearl River in China, and the Hula Lake in Isreal, among others. 3 Destroying the Elwha dam in the state of Washington has been studied seriously as a way of restoring the ecosystem and sheries in the Elwha River area.
optimal. We go beyond the 0-1 approach and assume that the size of the project is endogenously chosen in all periods. Thus, resource management is modeled as a closed-loop stochastic dynamic optimization problem that determines the extent of both investments and restoration, and the probability and degree of irreversibility.
We introduce a new concept, called irreversibility cost (IC), which measures the expected loss due to costly restoration and irreversibility. IC is monotonically related to the Arrow-Fisher-Henry option value (OV) in problems of xed project size and absolute irreversibility, but is applicable to more general problems of variable project size and costly restoration. IC highlights the implications of negative net benet of development, and the adjustment in the optimal project scale it entails.
The concept of restoration emphasized here is related to the disinvestment concept in Abel and Eberly (1994) . In their case, disinvestment is undertaken when selling the equipment is more protable than continuing the operation. Our model is dierent because in resource development, the reason for restoration is negative e n vironmental impact. We will obtain some counterintuitive results, showing that the value of resource projects may decline with future uncertainty, and that increased discount rate may encourage investment.
For natural resource projects, there is an important distinction between technical and economic irreversibility. The former happens when there does not exist a technology that can mitigate the negative impacts of the development. Extinction of endangered species due to resource development falls into this category. The original work of Arrow and Fisher (1974) and some of its applications (such as Fisher, Krutilla and Cicchetti (1972) ) seem to assume technical irreversibility. Economic irreversibility arises when it is not optimal to restore the development e v en though technologies exist for doing so. For example, Caballero (1991) considered irreversibility a s corresponding to innite marginal cost for negative adjustments of the project size. Our framework applies to technical irreversibility but we focus on economic irreversibility. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we assume irreversibility to illustrate an analytical framework based on a new concept, irreversibility cost. We compare irreversibility cost with the option value dened in Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) . We replicate some of the standard results of ROT using the new framework, and show that in our model higher discount rate promotes development. Section 2 considers costly restoration and shows that the degree of irreversibility is an endogenous choice. It also illustrates that the xed cost of restoration has continuous impacts on levels of development and restoration. Section 3 concludes the paper and discusses implications of the results and possible future research. The appendices include model details and proof of the theorems.
Basic Model and Irreversibility Cost
We consider a risk neutral decision maker facing a net benet function B t (K t ; w t ), where K t = P t s=1 I s is the total capacity of the project, I t is the level of development (or restoration if I t is negative), and w t is the random variable in period t, for t = 1 ; 2. 5 Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Pindyck (1988) where 5 Choosing total capacity, instead of total capacity and current period investment level, as an argument for B t () is for the sake of simplicity. In principle, the net benet function should have three arguments: B t (Kt; I t ; w t ) = Consider two period sequential resource development with complete resolution of uncertainty (that is, the value of the random variable is observed at the beginning of each period Appendix A derives the optimal second period development,Î 2 , depending on I 1 and w 2 , illustrated in Figure 1 . The dashed curves indicate the optimal levels of I 2 when the investment is perfectly reversible: I 1 is so high and w 2 is so low that the optimal strategy is to restore. However, due to irreversibilityÎ 2 = 0 in this case.
For any I 1 (e.g. I 1 = 2 in Figure 1 ), there is a critical level of w 2 , denoted as w c 2 (I 1 ) (e.g. b 2
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In a static framework, B t Ktwtwt < 0 means that increased uncertainty i n w t reduces expected optimal Kt. We will show that, as in ROT, dynamic optimization further enhances this eect of uncertainty. (A3) guarantees that the static and dynamic eects of uncertainty w ork in the same direction.
in Figure 1) , below which the irreversibility constraint is binding (formal denition in Appendix A). When it is binding, there is a loss in the second period compared with the scenario of perfect reversibility (e.g. optimization without the constraint I 2 0). We dene irreversibility cost to be the expected loss in the second period associated with I 1 :
where f() is the density function of w 2 , and I r 2 (I 1 ; w 2 ) is the optimal second period development without the irreversibility constraint, that is, 
Theorem 4 in Appendix A shows that I C ( I 1 ) is increasing and convex in I 1 .
The maximization problem in (1) can be transformed to directly include the irreversibility cost in the objective function. The maximization is equivalent to a situation where the decision maker pays the irreversibility cost in return for a perfectly reversible investment e n vironment. Let M r = E w 2 max I 2 B 2 (I 1 + I 2 ; w 2 ) (4) be the expected second period benet with perfect reversibility. Then E w 2 J(I 1 ; w 2 ) = M r I C ( I 1 ) (Theorem 5 of Appendix A) and the maximization problem in (1) can be rewritten as:
Note that M r is independent o f I 1 , because for any I 1 , the optimal second period capacity K 2 is always achieved by adjusting the level of I 2 . This is due to the perfect substitutability b e t w een I 1 and I 2 in the net benet function. Thus the irreversibility cost fully captures I 1 's impact on the second period decision. The presentation in (5) enables us to evaluate the impact of uncertainty on investment through its impact on the irreversibility cost:
Theorem 1 Let F i (), i = a; b be two cumulative distribution functions of w 2 , with F a second order stochastically dominating F b . The marginal irreversibility cost associated with F a is smaller than that with F b . That is, the rst period investment under F a is higher than under F b .
A direct implication of Theorem 1 is that increased future uncertainty reduces optimal I 1 , which is similar to Pindyck (1988) . In his interpretation, higher uncertainty raises the \option value" of delaying partial investment, leading to a smaller project size. Here, increased uncertainty raises the probability o f the irreversibility constraint being binding (regretting the original investment), prompting more cautious investment decisions.
The eects of uncertainty on the value of the project can be analyzed using (4) and (5). It depends on two eects, through I Cand through M r : As 2 increases, the irreversibility cost (I C )increases since higher uncertainty raises the probability that the project is over-sized. The unconstrained second period benet M r may o r m a y not increase depending on the curvature of the benet function B 2 (K 2 ; w 2 ). We can show that when B 2 (K 2 ; w 2 ) is linear in w 2 , the increase in M r dominates that in I C ,and the project value is increasing in uncertainty, which is consistent with Pindyck (1988) . 7 However, in resource development projects, the most signicant uncertainty i s o f environmental impacts. In most cases, the loss associated with serious environmental damage is more than proportional the gain associated with environmental improvement. The benet function may beconcave in w 2 , especially where the irreversibility constraint is binding. In this case, the increase in I Cdue to higher uncertainty m a y dominate the increase in M r , and the project value may be concave in the level of uncertainty.
It becomes clear then that the risk-neutral decision maker may demonstrate risk averse behavior: increased uncertainty may lead to both less development and less payo. In this context, the irreversibility cost may be considered as an insurance premium: the decision maker pays I C ( I 1 ) i n exchange for the insurance of perfect reversibility. 7 Pindyck studied price uncertainty where per period payo function is linear in the random variable.
The potential future loss from current i n v estment c hanges the direction of the impact of interest rate on resource allocation. Thus far, we have not considered discounting the second period explicitly, e v en though we allow B 1 and B 2 to be dierent. Assuming B 2 = 1 1+i B 2 0 (K 2 ; w 2 ) where i is the discount rate and B 2 0 is the temporal benet of the project, one can show that higher i leads to higher I 1 (Theorem 6 in Appendix A). That is, higher discount rate leads to more, instead of less, initial development. Higher i reduces second period benet, but also reduces the irreversibility cost IC and MIC. Because of irreversibility, i n v estment in rst period has a much bigger impact on future cost than future benet. Discounting thus reduces the net cost incurred in the future due to current development, leading to more current development.
This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that discounting discourages investment. The inter-temporal pattern of cost and benet in the conventional investment model is that cost occurs rst and benets later. But many natural resource projects have the opposite pattern: benets are initially enjoyed at the cost of the future. Once the timing sequence of cost and benet is reversed, the impact of discount rate on investment is reversed. Then with a higher discount rate, it is more likely that a big project is built now and restoration is conducted later.
Irreversibility cost is monotonically related to the much used concept in ROT, the ArrowFisher-Henry option value (OV). In fact, OV provides the lower bound for IC and equals IC for small projects. 8 To see this, we modify our model following the investment problem in Arrow and Fisher (1974) , where the decision of executing a project of size K is made in either the current or the next period. Absolute irreversibility means that if the project is executed in period 1, the capacity remains at K in both periods. Perfect reversibility means that the project can be reversed in the second period so that the capacity can be zero, depending on the state of nature. Then 8 Since OV is the value of information conditional on the project being delayed (see Hanemann (1989) ), our statement about the relationship between IC and OV also applies to that between IC and the (conditional) value of information.
Theorem 2 The relation between IC and OV c an be expressed as 
where the second term on the right hand side is the expected gain of delaying the project calculated using the open-loop approach. Note that OV(K)=I C ( K )when K is small, since the dierence between the integrals in (6) is negative when K is small and positive when K is large.
To see the intuition of (6) benet when further development is needed (so I r 2 is used). The third component is the expected benet when restoration is needed and its amount has to be optimally chosen.
The optimal restoration decisions are illustrated in Figure 2 . At w 2 = w c 2 (I 1 ), there is no incentive for restoration. As w 2 decreases, restoration is not feasible at rst, since the variable benet of restoration is small and cannot compensate for the xed cost that would have to be incurred if restoration is undertaken. However, as w 2 further declines, the variable benet of restoration increases, and eventually will surpass the xed cost when w 2 falls below a critical level, denoted as w r 2 (I 1 ; c 0 ), and restoration occurs. We denote this optimal restoration level as I R (I 1 ; w 2 ). It is straightforward to show that (see Appendix B) the critical level w r 2 (I 1 ; c 0 ) is increasing in I 1 and decreasing in c 0 .
Using the irreversibility cost approach of the last section, (7) can be rewritten as: 
where M r , dened in (4), is the second period benet with free restoration (or perfect reversibility), Higher xed cost of restoration reduces the expected restoration and the restoration eort for each state of nature. The intuition is that as the xed restoration cost increases, the decision maker would prefer a lower probability of restoration, leading to less development in the rst period. Thus less restoration is optimal for each state of nature. We can then conclude that Remark 1 In a dynamic and stochastic framework, the xed cost of restoration aects not only whether or not there is restoration but also the level of restoration.
In fact, we can use our framework to show that the marginal value of investment, i.e. the marginal q in the neoclassical investment theory (Abel and Eberly (1994) ), depends continuously on c 0 . For example, by (8) we can deduct that the value function of second period investment is V 2 (I 1 ; c 0 ) = M r I C R ( I 1 ; c 0 ). Then clearly the marginal value of a size I 1 project (which is negative in our special case) is decreasing in c 0 .
The discussion so far indicates that in the second period restoration may be needed. The probability and magnitude of restoration depend on the downside support of the random variable w 2 , the xed cost c 0 , and initial development I 1 . For a given I 1 , absolute irreversibility corresponds to a situation where the xed cost of restoration is so high that the probability of restoration is zero, or w r 2 (I 1 ; c 0 ) = w 2 . It does not depend on the marginal cost of restoration, since a higher marginal cost would only lead to a smaller amount of restoration (but does not lead to no restoration), unless the marginal cost is innite. Caballero (1991) identied absolute irreversibility with innite marginal restoration cost. Then absolute irreversibility is a rare event since innite marginal cost rarely happens. However, we show here that absolute irreversibility happens as long as the xed cost of negative adjustment is reasonably high. This scenario is much more likely to happen.
This interpretation means that irreversibility is a dynamic concept and evolves with changes in parameters. For example, changes in technologies that reduce c 0 and changes in tastes that increase the damage of development m a y make irreversible projects in the past become \restorable" now.
The degree of irreversibility is endogenously determined when I 1 is chosen. Absolute irreversibility is less likely for large projects than for small projects. ROT assumes away this endogeneity b y assuming absolute irreversibility. Therefore, allowing variable project size in ROT conicts with the absolute irreversibility assumption.
The cost of assuming absolute irreversibility (and ignoring restoration possibilities) depends on the nature of the problem. Ceteris paribus, it is small if both the xed and variable costs of restoration are high. If resource development leads to technical irreversibility, such as extinction of species, then the restoration cost is innite and the assumption of absolute (economic) irreversibility is justied. 9 In some cases such as urban sprawl when agricultural or forest lands are converted to urban use, the cost of restoration is high and the assumption of irreversibility is realistic. However, in other cases such as restoring the sheries that are damaged by w ater development projects, the restoration cost is suciently low so that the assumption of absolute irreversibility i s unrealistic.
In fact, we h a v e witnessed signicant restoration eorts in sheries. 10 3 Discussion and Conclusion This paper expands ROT to situations where a natural resource development project may make the decision maker worse-o and costly restoration is feasible. We i n troduced a notion of irreversibility cost which is the expected cost due to the irreversibility constraint and restoration cost. This concept is related to, but more general than the Arrow-Fisher-Henry option value.
Even without relaxing the assumption of absolute irreversibility, the implications of ROT may be dierent for resource projects than those for conventional investment projects. We showed that the value of a project may not be convex in the underlying random variable, due to the possibility of benet loss of an over-sized project. A risk neutral decision maker may thus demonstrate risk averse behavior: both the scale of development and the associated payo go down as the level of uncertainty rises. This result highlights the importance of information gathering and uncertainty resolution in project formulation.
We also showed that for resource projects, higher discount rate may in fact lead to more development. It encourages the mentality of \building now and restoring later." This result has important implications for the choice of discount rate in resource project evaluation. Low discount rate has been blamed for excessive resource development. We argue that this is mainly due to the practice of neglecting the possibility of costly restoration in formulating and evaluating resource terms of consumption substitution), its extinction is likely to incur economic losses (i.e. we wish to restore it) only in very extreme situations. In this case, irreversibility can be safely ignored: there may be absolute irreversibility, but essentially it does not aect the optimal resource development.
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One example is the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA) in California which allocates water to help restore salmon shery in San Francisco Bay Delta that was negatively impacted by w ater development.
projects. Once costly restoration is considered, the reverse may betrue: low discount rate may encourage more cautious development decisions.
When costly restoration is allowed, the degree of irreversibility becomes an endogenous choice.
Absolute irreversibility happens only when the xed restoration cost is suciently high and when the random variable has a suciently high downside support (i.e. a bad scenario cannot happen).
ROT, by assuming absolute irreversibility, assumes away an endogenous choice. Further, contrary to the popular argument that large projects tend to be irreversible, we nd that absolute irreversibility is more likely for small projects.
We showed that understanding the structure of restoration cost function is important: the xed cost of restoration aects not only whether or not restoration should be undertaken, but also the level of development (and restoration) decisions. More generally, the marginal value of investment, i.e. the marginal q in neoclassical investment theory, continuously depends on the xed cost.
Although we have focused on resource development projects, the framework can be used to analyze more conventional investment decisions where costly correction of mistakes is allowed. In essence, restoration is a way of correcting the mistake of too much initial investment. Similar scenario may happen in other settings, such as a certain investment leading to the possibility of environmental liability. One example is the federal Superfund cleanup program, showing that a protable investment m a y bring forth an environmental liability that out-weight the earned prot (Acton (1989) Theorem 4 
Subtracting (13) 
The rst term on the right hand side of (21) is the cost of absolute irreversibility (when restoration is not optimal), and the second term is the sum of the cost of restoration and irreversibility (when the restoration is partial). Note that if c 0 is innity, w (24) 
